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Abstract 
Using hand-collected data on the backgrounds of venture capitalists (VCs), we show that in a 
typical venture capital firm in our sample, 13.9% of VCs have been entrepreneurs before 
becoming a VC, referred to as entrepreneur VCs. Both OLS and 2SLS analyses suggest that 
venture capital firms employing a greater fraction of entrepreneur VCs have better performance. 
In addition, the positive effect of entrepreneur VCs on venture capital firm performance is 
stronger for smaller and younger venture capital firms, and venture capital firms specializing in 
high-tech industries and in early-stage investments. We further explore performance implications 
of VCs with prior experience in a finance-related field (i.e., Wall Street experience) and prior 
experience in a non-finance related field (i.e., Main Street experience). We find that contrary to 
prior experience in entrepreneurship, neither prior experience in Wall Street nor in Main Street is 
significantly related to venture capital firm performance. Finally, we provide evidence that 
entrepreneur VCs have greater individual performance in terms of VC rankings established by 
Forbes. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that entrepreneur VCs have a better 
understanding of the business of starting and developing a new firm due to their first-hands 
experience, and play an important role in reducing the gaps in information and difference of 
opinions between an entrepreneur and the VCs backing the entrepreneur.   
 
 
 
_______________________ 
* We thank Joan Farre-Mensa, Richard Townsend, and participants at the 2012 Kauffman-SFS Entrepreneurial 
Finance and Innovation conference. We thank Michael Flores, Yifei Mao, Aseem Puri, and Zhong Zhang for their 
excellent research assistance. We remain responsible for all errors and omissions. 
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“Anyone who is not a former entrepreneur should not be in VC (industry).” 
Eric Benhamou, a co-founder of Bridge Communications, 
ex-CEO of 3Com, and founder of Benhamou Global Ventures  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show substantial heterogeneity and persistence in the 
performance of the venture capital industry and argue that it can be explained by the underlying 
heterogeneity in the skill and quality of venture capitalists (VCs). But a substantially unanswered 
question is what makes a skilled and high quality VC? Our understanding of this important 
question is incomplete at best, perhaps due to limitations in availability of data on individual 
characteristics of VCs. In this paper, we focus on prior entrepreneurship experience of individual 
VCs as a driver of skill and quality. Using hand-collected data on the professional backgrounds 
of VCs, we study VCs who have been entrepreneurs before becoming a VC, referred to as 
entrepreneur VCs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that entrepreneur VCs have become common in 
recent years. For example, based on a recent article from the New York Times, insiders in the 
venture capital industry believe that “venture capital is once again attracting the right mix of 
former founders and operators who are truly passionate about nurturing companies and who 
have hard work-won insights that can help founders succeed.”1  
We provide evidence that in a typical top performing venture capital firm in our sample, 
13.9% of VCs have been former entrepreneurs in that they founded at least one start-up company 
before becoming a VC.2 We also show a positive relation between the fraction of entrepreneur 
VCs in a venture capital firm and the venture capital firm’s performance using various 
performance measures. In addition, we find that former entrepreneurship experience of a VC is 
                                                            
1 Source: “Do former entrepreneurs make better venture capitalists” – NYTimes.com, November 16, 2011. 
2 The current study focuses on the top 300 venture capital firms recorded in the Thomson Venture Economics 
database using the 2010 venture capital firm reputation scores developed in Nahata (2008).  
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positively related not only to the performance of the VC firm she works for, but also to her own 
individual success measured through a VC ranking survey conducted by the Forbes magazine, 
suggesting that former entrepreneurs make successful VCs.  
An extensive body of work in financial economics establishes that VCs play an important 
role for the growth and success of the start-up companies they finance. VCs advise small 
entrepreneurial start-ups (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2008), provide help with the 
professionalization and enhancement of the management team (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; 
Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian, 2011), exercise intensive monitoring and corporate 
governance (Barry et al., 1990; Lerner, 1995; Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003, 
2004; Tian, 2011), motivate and nurture innovation (Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Kortum and 
Lerner, 2000; Tian and Wang, 2012), and ease their portfolio firms’ access to public capital 
markets (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner, 1994; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Chemmanur and 
Loutskina, 2008; Nahata, 2008). However, VCs and entrepreneurs often work together in an 
environment characterized by misaligned incentives and informational asymmetries. We posit in 
this paper that the information gap between VCs and entrepreneurs could be lower if VCs 
backing an entrepreneur’s start-up have been a former entrepreneur themselves, given that such 
VCs have already experienced the process of starting and developing a new start-up company 
before becoming a VC. The reduced information gap between entrepreneur VCs and 
entrepreneurs then could manifest itself in the performance of the venture capital firm at which 
entrepreneur VCs work and in the individual performance of such VCs.  
 We find that the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital firm is positively 
related to the venture capital firm’s market share in the IPO market. Similarly, there is a positive 
relation between the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital firm and the fraction of 
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portfolio firms the venture capital firm is able to bring public, a metric used in the literature as an 
important performance measure in the venture capital industry. To help establish causality and 
address the concern that our baseline results are driven by unobservable VC and venture capital 
firm characteristics, we construct an instrument based on the local supply of entrepreneurial 
VCs, and conduct the two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions. Our analyses are consistent 
with the baseline results.  
If entrepreneur VCs help reduce information asymmetries present in a VC-entrepreneur 
relationship, one may expect that their ability to do so would be more pronounced when there is 
a larger information gap between the entrepreneurs and VCs. Consistent with this conjecture, we 
find that the positive relation between the fraction of entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firm 
performance is stronger in smaller and younger venture capital firms, and venture capital firms 
specializing in high-tech industries and in early-stage investments. 
 While exploring the relation between entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firm 
performance, we also include other important background information regarding individual VCs. 
Specifically, we look at whether a given VC has an operational background in terms of having 
worked in a non-finance industry (i.e., Main Street) before becoming a VC. Similarly, we check 
whether a given VC has worked in the finance industry (i.e., Wall Street) before becoming a VC. 
We also include educational backgrounds of VCs in terms of having an MBA degree, having a 
doctoral degree, whether the VC graduated from an elite school, as well as VC age and tenure in 
the current venture capital firm.   
We find that previous experience in both a finance and non-finance related industry is 
insignificant in explaining the venture capital firm performance while an entrepreneurship 
background remains positively and significantly related to performance after controlling for all 
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professional and educational background characteristics that the previous literature has used in 
explaining performance. Hence, our paper makes a new contribution to the literature by 
documenting the existence of VCs who have been former entrepreneurs before becoming a VC 
as well as establishing a positive relation between such VCs and venture capital firm 
performance. While it is well-known that the majority of angel investors are retired 
entrepreneurs, to our best knowledge, our paper is the first studying VC investors with a previous 
entrepreneurship background. Our findings are complementary to the evidence reported in 
Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008) that VCs’ prior business experience is positively related 
to their interactions with their portfolio firms, which, in turn, positively contributes to the success 
of portfolio firms, based on a sample that includes the survey for 17 European countries.3 Our 
findings are also related to Zarutskie (2010) that studies the relation between professional and 
educational backgrounds of VCs and venture capital firm performance.4  
After investigating the relation between entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firm 
performance, we turn our attention to explore whether an entrepreneurship background explains 
individual VC performance as well. Using individual VC performance rankings established by 
Forbes, we provide evidence that VCs who have been former entrepreneurs are more likely to be 
included on the most successful VC list established by Forbes. Importantly, a previous 
background in neither Wall Street nor Main Street is related to a higher Forbes performance 
ranking.  
                                                            
3 We extend this line of inquiry one step further by using a more refined classification of prior experience of VCs 
before becoming a VC. More specifically, we classify VCs into one of three categories, VCs with prior 
entrepreneurship experience of starting a new business, VCs with prior experience in Wall Street, and VCs with 
prior experience in Main Street, and show that it is the VC’s prior entrepreneurship experience which contributes to 
the success of venture capital firms she works at. 
4 Note that while Zarutskie (2010) studies the effect of a VC’s previous background in an entrepreneurial start-up 
company, she does not differentiate between VCs who worked as executives in a start-up and VCs who started a 
new business themselves. Our paper defines VCs as entrepreneur VCs only if they started a new start-up company 
before becoming a VC.  
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 analyzes the 
relation between entrepreneur VCs and the performance of the venture capital firm they work at. 
Section 4 explores whether an entrepreneurship background is related to an individual VC 
performance. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
We construct our venture capitalist (VC) sample based on the following procedures. We 
start with the top 300 venture capital firms recorded in the Thomson Venture Economics 
database using Nahata (2008) venture capital firm reputation scores as of year 2010. This venture 
firm reputation score is based on the dollar market value of all companies the venture firm took 
public since 1980 normalized by the aggregate market value of all venture capital-backed 
companies that went public since 1980. Because the Venture Economics database provides an 
incomplete list of VCs working at the venture capital firms, we search the websites of these 300 
venture capital firms and hand-collect the names and biographies of individual VCs if available. 
We exclude 110 venture capital firms from our sample since they do not provide any information 
about their VCs on their websites.  
We then match our sample of VCs with the BoardEx database of Management 
Diagnostics Ltd. BoardEx contains extensive biographical information on corporate directors and 
top executives including their educational background, employment history, and other 
professional and social activities.  We employ a three-round matching procedure based on VC 
names as well as the names of the venture capital firms they work at. Specifically, the first round 
starts with merging our VC sample with the BoardEx database using both the VC’s first and last 
names and the venture capital firm names. We are able to identify 306 VCs from the BoardEx 
database in this round. In the second round, we look for unique matches of VC’s first and last 
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names in BoardEx (for example, Jim Breyer of Accel Partners). Since these names are uniquely 
identified in the BoardEx database, mismatching concerns are minimized. However, we still 
perform a double check using VC age to screen out mismatches, which leaves us 1,133 VCs in 
this round of matching. In the last round, we focus on the matches based on VC names that are 
not unique in the BoardEx database (for example, there are four David Cowan covered by 
BoardEx, and one of them is a VC at Bessemer Venture Partners). We screen out mismatches 
using both VC age and educational background as additional criteria, and this yields a match of 
125 VCs in the third round. Our final sample contains 1,564 individual VCs working for 154 
venture capital firms as of July 2011 with complete coverage of educational and professional 
backgrounds of VCs.  
To identify entrepreneur VCs, we read each VC’s biography carefully and code a VC as 
an entrepreneur VC if she has founded at least one start-up company before becoming a VC. We 
search for “found” and “founder” in their biographies and classify a VC as an entrepreneur VC 
only if he has founded an industrial firm before becoming a VC. We collect the industry 
information and SIC codes of the firms VCs worked before becoming a VC from the Dun & 
Bradstreet database for privately held firms. We then construct two other variables, Wall Street 
VC and Main Street VC, which capture other professional backgrounds for a VC. If a VC has 
worked at a financial firm (SIC code 6000-6999) before joining the venture capital firm, we 
classify her as a Wall Street VC. If a VC has worked at a non-financial firm before becoming a 
VC, we classify her as a Main Street VC. A VC’s prior entrepreneurial experience, Wall Street 
experience, and Main Street experience are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
We collect each VC’s personal data from BoardEx such as age, gender, degree (MBA, 
JD, MD, or Ph.D.), and possession of professional certifications (CPA or CFA). We construct 
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each VC’s tenure in the current venture capital firm using the starting year information provided 
in her biography. We further obtain venture capital firm characteristics from the Venture 
Economics database. This database includes the number of start-up companies the VC firm has 
invested in, the number of financing rounds it has participated in, and the investment outcomes 
of its portfolio firms.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the venture capital firm characteristics in our 
sample. In a typical venture capital firm, 13.9% of VCs are classified as entrepreneur VCs. The 
fractions of VCs with prior Wall Street and Main Street experience are 36.8% and 72.5%, 
respectively. The average VC in our sample is 54.5 years old, and has worked in the current 
venture capital firm for 12.5 years. Regarding VCs’ educational background, on average, 46% of 
VCs are MBA degree holders, 16.3% have JD/MD/Ph.D. degrees, 38.5% graduated from elite 
schools, and 6% of them have a professional certification such as a CPA or a CFA.5  
An average venture capital firm in our sample is 21 years old, has invested 179 start-up 
companies, and has participated in 475 financing rounds since 1980. 20.6% of their portfolio 
companies eventually went public. Recall that these 154 firms are among the most successful 
and reputable 300 venture capital firms, therefore it is not surprising that the venture capital 
firms in our sample are more experienced and more successful than an average venture capital 
firm recorded in the Venture Economics database.  
 
3. Entrepreneur VCs and Venture Capital Firm Performance  
 In this section, we examine the relation between the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a 
venture capital firm and the performance of the venture capital firm. In Section 3.1, we report 
                                                            
5 Elite schools include Harvard University, Yale University, MIT, Stanford University, University of Pennsylvania, 
Princeton University, and Dartmouth College. These are the most commonly attended schools by VCs in our 
sample.  
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our baseline results of the relation between entrepreneur VCs on venture capital firm 
performance. Section 3.2 addresses the identification issue using an instrumental variable 
approach. In Section 3.3, we further investigate the effect of entrepreneur VCs on venture capital 
firm performance across various types of venture capital firms. In Section 3.4, in addition to the 
entrepreneurship background, we include VCs’ Wall Street and Main Street backgrounds and 
examine the relative importance of different backgrounds on venture capital firm performance.  
 
3.1. Entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firm performance  
 To study the relation between entrepreneur VCs and the performance of venture capital 
firm they work at, we estimate the following empirical model using the cross-sectional ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression: 
 Performance = α + β × Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs + δ'Z + Industry + u   (1)  
where the observational unit is a venture capital firm. Our first measure of Performance is the 
natural logarithm of a VC’s IPO market share, Ln(IPO market share), a widely used performance 
and reputation measure for venture capital firms introduced by Nahata (2008). We also use the 
proportion of a venture capital firm’s portfolio companies that eventually go public, IPO exit, as 
an alternative measure of venture capital firm performance.6 The main variable of interest in this 
analysis is Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs, which equals the fraction of VCs with prior 
entrepreneurship experience within a venture capital firm. Z is a vector of venture capital firm 
and individual VC characteristics that could contribute to the performance of a venture capital 
                                                            
6 Although both IPOs and acquisitions have been considered as successful exit by previous studies (e.g., Gompers 
and Lerner, 2000; Brander, Amit, and Antweiler, 2002; Sørensen, 2007; Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2008; 
Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011), existing literature suggests that going public is a more desirable exit 
pathway than acquisitions for both entrepreneurs and venture capital investors. For example, Brau, Francis, and 
Kohers (2003) show that IPO firms enjoy a 22% “valuation premium” relative to firms that are acquired, and 
Sahlman (1990) argues that almost all of the returns for venture capital investors are earned on their eventually 
going public portfolio firms. Bayar and Chemmanur (2011) suggest that only the best-quality VC-backed firms can 
access the public capital markets through an IPO.  
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firms. It includes the venture capital firm’s general investment experience (Ln(no. of firms 
invested in the past), Ln(no. of rounds invested in the past), Ln(VC firm age)), as well as the 
venture capital firm’s expertise in certain industries (Industry concentration) and in certain 
development stages of ventures (% investment in early ventures). We also control for VCs’ 
average age (Ln(average VC age)), average tenure in the firm (Ln(average VC tenure)), 
educational background (Fraction of MBA VC, Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC, Fraction of VCs 
from elite schools), and possession of professional certification (Fraction of VCs with 
CFA/CPA). Industry accounts for unobservable variations within the 18-industry classifications 
of Venture Economics that may influence the venture capital firm’s performance.7 Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.  
 Table 2 reports the regression results estimating equation (1). The dependent variable in 
columns (1) – (3) is Ln(IPO market share). Because our three measures of venture capital firm 
investment experience (the number of firms the firm has invested in, the number of rounds it has 
participated in, and firm age) are highly correlated with each other, we include them one by one 
in the first three models in Table 2. The coefficient estimates of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs 
are positive and significant in all three specifications, suggesting that the fraction of entrepreneur 
VCs is positively related to the venture capital firm’s IPO market share. Since IPO market share 
is in the logarithm form, the coefficient estimate of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs gives us the 
semi-elasticity of a firm’s IPO market share with respect to its fraction of entrepreneur VCs. The 
magnitude of the Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs coefficient estimate in column (1) suggests that 
increasing the fraction of entrepreneur VCs from the 25th percentile (0) to the 75th percentile 
(0.2) of its distribution is associated with a 10.5%  (=0.523 * 0.2) increase in the venture capital 
                                                            
7 If a venture capital firm invests in multiple industries, we choose the industry in which the firm invests the largest 
amount of capital since 1980 for the industry fixed effect.   
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firm’s IPO market share. This translates to a 0.15 percentage point increase in the firm’s IPO 
market share given the mean IPO market share is 1.4 percentage points in our sample. In 
columns (4) - (6), we replace the dependent variable with IPO exit. The coefficient estimates of 
Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs are positive and significant at the 5% level in all columns, 
suggesting that a larger fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital firm is positively 
related to the IPO exit rate of portfolio firms backed by the venture capital firm. For example, the 
coefficient estimate of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs in column (4) suggests that an increase in 
the fraction of entrepreneur VCs from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of its distribution 
is associated with a 1.3%  (=0.063 * 0.2) increase in the venture capital firm’s IPO exit rate.  
 It is worth pointing out that with the small sample size of our analysis, 154 observations, 
the power of the empirical tests is typically very low. However, we are still able to identify a 
both economically and statistically positive and significant relation between the fraction of VCs 
with entrepreneurial experience and the performance of the venture capital firm.  
 
3.2. Identification  
 In the previous section, we show that the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital 
firm is positively and significantly related to the VC firm performance. One concern with these 
baseline results is that our findings may be driven by endogenous matching between 
entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firms with better performance. More specifically, certain 
unobservable venture capital firm or VC characteristics omitted from the baseline regression may 
be positively related to the fraction of entrepreneur VC as well as the venture capital firm’s 
performance. Therefore, our earlier results may not necessarily reflect a causality flowing from 
entrepreneur VCs to firm performance. To help establish causality, we construct an instrumental 
11 
 
variable (IV) and use a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach attempting to identify the causal 
effect of entrepreneur VCs on venture capital firm performance.  
Our instrument is based on the rationale that the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a given 
venture capital firm should be high when the local supply of entrepreneur VCs is high (see, e.g., 
Berger et al. (2005) and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008) for a similar argument in 
different research settings). Thus we expect that, other things equal, a given venture capital firm 
is more likely to hire entrepreneur VCs and therefore have a higher fraction of such VCs when 
local entrepreneur VCs are in plentiful supply.  
Following this intuition, we construct the instrument, Local Fraction of Entrepreneur 
VCs, that is the number of entrepreneur VCs divided by the total number of VCs in the same 
MSA area. The IV reflects the local supply of entrepreneur VCs and thus should affect the 
fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a given venture capital firm. It is reasonable to believe that this 
instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction, as the local supply of entrepreneur VCs is unlikely 
to directly affect the subsequent performance of the venture capital firm.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results from the first-stage regressions with Fraction of 
Entrepreneur VCs as the dependent variables. The main independent variable of interest is the 
constructed instrument. All other control variables are the same as those in the baseline OLS 
regressions. We suppress coefficient estimates of these control variables to save space. The 
coefficient estimates of the instrument are positive and significant at the 1% level across all 
regressions. The results suggest that venture capital firms indeed tend to hire more VCs with 
entrepreneurial background when the local supply of such VCs is high. The t-statistics of the 
instrument are very high, i.e., the t-statistics are around 6 in all regressions. Therefore, based on 
the rule-of-thumb diagnostics suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), the instruments are highly 
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correlated with the endogenous right-hand-side variable in the second stage and do not appear to 
suffer from weak instrument problem.  
Table 3 Panel B reports the second-stage regression results, with VC firm performance as 
the dependent variable and the predicted values of the fraction of entrepreneur VCs as the main 
independent variable. The coefficient estimates of the instrumented Fraction of Entrepreneur 
VCs remain positive and significant. The economic magnitudes are even larger: an increase in 
the fraction of entrepreneur VCs from the 25th percentile (0) to the 75th percentile (0.2) of its 
distribution is associated with a 21.9 ~ 28.3% increase in the venture capital firm’s IPO market 
share, and a 3.3 ~ 3.4% increase in the venture capital firm’s IPO exit rate.  
Comparing results obtained from the OLS regressions (Table 2) with those obtained from 
the 2SLS regressions (Panel B of Table 3), it is interesting to observe that the magnitudes of the 
2SLS coefficient estimates of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs are larger than those of the OLS 
estimates, even though the coefficient estimates from both approaches are positive and 
statistically significant. This observation seems to suggest that OLS regressions bias the 
coefficient estimates downward due to endogeneity, which is because some omitted variables 
might be associated with poorer VC firm performance, and at the same time, make the firm more 
attractive to entrepreneur VCs. The venture capital firm’s entrepreneurial corporate culture could 
be an example of such an omitted variable. For instance, a venture capital firm with a very 
“entrepreneurial” corporate culture is certainly very attractive to VCs who have entrepreneurial 
backgrounds. Therefore, we are more likely to observe entrepreneurial VCs in these venture 
capital firms. On the other hand, venture capital firms with entrepreneurial culture may tend to 
invest in early-stage and risky projects that could potentially adversely affect its performance. 
This negative correlation caused by the omitted variable is the main driving force that biases the 
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OLS coefficient estimates of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs downward. Once we use the 
instrument to clean up the correlation between the fraction of entrepreneur VCs and the residual 
(the VC firm’s unobservable characteristics) in Equation (1), the endogeneity concern is 
significantly mitigated and the coefficient estimates become more positive.  
Taken together, our 2SLS analysis suggests that the observed positive relation between 
entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firm performance is unlikely to be driven by endogeneity 
concerns, and there appears to be a causal effect of entrepreneur VCs on the performance of 
venture capital firms.  
 
3.3. Effects of Entrepreneur VCs across Various Venture Capital Firms 
 So far we provide evidence that the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital firm 
is positively related to its performance. One may expect that the magnitude of this effect could 
differ across various types of venture capital firms. If entrepreneur VCs help mitigate 
information asymmetries between venture capital investors and entrepreneurial start-ups, we may 
expect that the positive relation between entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firm performance 
to be more pronounced for venture capital firms that are likely to experience a greater level of 
information asymmetry in their portfolio investments.   
 
3.3.1. Experienced vs. Inexperienced Venture Capital Firms 
Our first two proxies for information asymmetry are based on the investment experience 
of venture capital firms. Venture capital firms with less investment experience may have a 
poorer understanding of the business of start-up investment, and they could benefit to a greater 
extent from the first-hand skill and experience of entrepreneur VCs. Therefore, we expect the 
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positive relation between entrepreneur VCs and venture capital firm performance to be stronger 
for venture capital firms with less investment experience.  
 We obtain the number of portfolio firms that the venture capital firm has invested in since 
1980 from the Venture Economics database. We separate the sample into large VC firms and 
small venture capital firms based on whether the number of portfolio firms that the venture 
capital firm has invested in since 1980 is above or below the sample median. We separately 
estimate equation (1) for small VC firms and large VC firms, and report the regression results in 
Table 4. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is Ln(IPO market share). While the 
coefficient estimates of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs are statistically significant at the 5% level 
in the subsample of small VC firms, the coefficient estimates of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs in 
the subsample of large VC firms is positive but not statistically significant. We find similar 
results in columns (3) and (4) in which IPO exit is the dependent variable: the coefficient 
estimates of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs is positive and significant in the subsample of small 
VC firms, while insignificant in the subsample of large VC firms.  
 As an alternative measure of venture capital firm’s investment experience, we obtain the 
age of venture capital firms from the Venture Economics database. A venture capital firm is 
defined as a young (old) VC firm if its age is below (above) the sample median. Table 5 reports 
the estimation coefficients of equation (1) for young VC firms and old VC firms, respectively. 
The structure of Table 5 is parallel to that of Table 4. We find a positive and significant 
coefficient estimate of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs in the subsample of young VC firms, while 
positive but not statistically significant coefficient estimate of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs in 
the subsample of old VC firms. These findings in Table 4 and 5 are consistent with our 
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conjecture that less experienced (smaller or younger) venture firms could benefit more from 
entrepreneur VCs.  
 
3.3.2. High-tech vs. Non-high-tech VC Firms 
If entrepreneur VCs help mitigate information asymmetries between venture capital 
investors and entrepreneurial start-ups, we may expect the effect of entrepreneur VCs on venture 
capital firm performance to be more pronounced for the venture capital firms that invest more in 
start-ups in high-tech industries. For high-tech start-ups, the information gap between 
entrepreneurs and VCs is likely to be bigger, and entrepreneur VCs could play a more important 
role in reducing this gap. 
 The Venture Economics database provides information about the industry classifications 
of venture capital firms. Given the small-sample nature of our study, we use the most general 3-
industry classifications provided by the database: Medical/Health/Life Science, Information 
Technology, and Non-high Technology. We group the first two industries and label them as 
“High-tech industries”, and label the third industry group as “Non-high-tech industries”. If a 
venture capital firm invests in multiple industries, we choose the industry in which the venture 
capital firm invests the largest amount of capital and assign that industry to the venture capital 
firm. We separate our sample of venture capital firms into firms specializing in high-tech 
industries and firms specializing in non-high-tech industries, and estimate equation (1) for each 
subsample separately.  
 Table 6 presents the results on the relation between entrepreneur VCs and venture capital 
firm performance for high-tech and non-high tech venture capital firms. The dependent variables 
are Ln(IPO market share) in columns (1) and (2), and IPO exit in columns (3) and (4). We find 
that the Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs has a positive and significant coefficient estimates on both 
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measures of venture capital firm performance in the subsample of VC firms investing in high-
tech industries. The coefficient estimates of Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs in the subsample of 
VC firms investing in non-high-tech industries are, however, not statistically significant. This 
result suggests that while the fraction of entrepreneur VCs does not appear to affect the venture 
capital firm performance for firms specializing in non-high tech start-ups, entrepreneur VCs are 
positively related to the performance of the venture capital firms specializing in high-tech start-
up companies.  
 
3.3.3. Early-stage vs. Late-stage VC Firms 
Due to the nature of early-stage ventures, it is reasonable to expect that venture capital 
firms investing in early-stage start-ups are subject to a greater level of asymmetric information in 
their start-up investments. In addition, compared to late-stage start-ups, early-stage start-ups are 
characterized with greater risk and uncertainty and are more likely to fail. Hence, entrepreneur 
VCs could be more important for the survival of early-stage start-ups in terms of reducing the 
information gap between VCs and entrepreneurs. Therefore, one may expect the positive effect 
of entrepreneur VCs on venture capital firm performance to be stronger for the venture capital 
firms investing in early-stage start-ups.  
 The Venture Economics database provides information about the development stage of a 
start-up company when it receives the first-round venture capital financing. We define a start-up 
company as an early-stage start-up if it is in either the “start-up/seed” or “early” stages when it 
receives the first-round venture capital investment, and as a late-stage start-up if it is in 
“expansion”, “later stage”, or “buyout/acquisition” stages when it receives the first-round 
venture capital financing. We then calculate the proportion of early-stage start-ups in a venture 
capital firm’s portfolio since 1980, and partition the sample into two subsamples, VC firms 
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investing in early-stage ventures and VC firms investing in late-stage ventures, based on whether 
the proportion of early-stage start-ups a venture capital firm has invested in is higher or lower 
than the sample median. 
We report the results based on the development stages of start-ups in Table 7. The 
coefficient estimate of the Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs is positive and significant at the 5% 
level in column (1) but is insignificant in column (2), where the dependent variable is Ln(IPO 
market share). Similarly, we observe a positive and significant effect of Fraction of 
Entrepreneur VCs on IPO exit in the subsample of VC firms specializing in early-stage ventures, 
and a positive but insignificant coefficient estimate in the subsample of VC firms specializing in 
late-stage ventures. These results suggest that the positive relation between the fraction of 
entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital firm and the performance of the venture capital firm is 
stronger for venture capital firms specializing more in early-stage start-ups.  
  
3.4. Entrepreneurship, Wall Street, and Main Street Experience 
 Our evidence so far has shown a positive relation between the fraction of entrepreneur 
VCs and the performance of the venture capital firm.  Zarutskie (2008, 2010) find that VCs with 
past experience involving an executive role on the Main Street and a finance role on the Wall 
Street are positively related to the success of their venture capital firm. In this section, we 
explore the relative importance of an entrepreneurship, Main Street, and Wall Street background 
on the performance of a venture capital firm. Specifically, we estimate the following model:  
    Performance = α + β1 × Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs + β2 × Fraction of Wall Street VCs +    
β3 × Main Street VCs + δ'Z + Industry + u
   
       (2) 
where the observational unit is a venture capital firm. The dependent variable, Performance, 
could be one of two variables used before, Ln(IPO market share) and IPO exit. The main 
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variables of interest are Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs, Fraction of Wall Street VCs, and 
Fraction of Main Street VCs. Z is a vector of controls defined in equation (1). We control for 
venture capital industry fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
 Table 8 reports the results estimating equation (2). The coefficient estimates of Fraction 
of Entrepreneur VCs remain positive and significant in all six columns. The magnitudes of 
Fraction of Entrepreneur VCs are slightly larger than those in the baseline regressions reported 
in Table 2 but remain very much comparable. We also notice that the coefficient estimates of 
Fraction of Wall Street VCs are positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting that having 
VCs with a previous experience in Wall Street is not related to a venture capital firm’s 
performance. The coefficient estimates of Fraction of Main Street VCs have mixed signs but 
none of them are statistically significant, suggesting that VCs’ previous background in Main 
Street is not related to firm performance. In summary, these results show that neither prior Wall 
Street experience nor prior Main Street experience of VCs is significantly related to venture 
capital firm performance. However, the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital firm 
remains positively related to its performance.  
 
4. Entrepreneur VCs and Individual VC Performance  
 In this section, we turn our attention to an individual VC level analysis to examine 
whether a VC’s prior entrepreneurship background positively contributes to her personal 
performance and success as a venture capitalist. As we argued before, VCs who are former 
entrepreneurs are likely to have hands-on experience in founding and developing start-ups, and 
therefore they are likely to have a better understanding about the nature of entrepreneurship. 
After they become VCs, the skills they obtained from their prior entrepreneurship background 
may help them better screen projects and better create values for start-up companies. In other 
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words, their prior entrepreneurship experience may give them a comparative advantage in 
becoming a more successful and recognized individual VC.  
 As a measure of the performance of an individual VC, we use the Forbes Midas List 
2011’s Top Tech Investors which lists the 100 most successful VCs in 2011.8 Specifically, we 
estimate the following probit model to examine whether entrepreneur VCs are more likely to 
have a higher Forbes performance ranking: 
      Top VC = α + β × Entrepreneur VCs + δ'Z + Industry + u
   
                           (3)  
where the observation unit is an individual VC. The dependent variable, Top VC, is an indicator 
variable which equals one if the VC is listed on the 2011 Forbes Top Tech Investor list, and zero 
otherwise. We include the usual control variables that capture both individual VC and venture 
capital firm characteristics in the regression. We also include the venture capital firm industry 
fixed effects in the regression. Since the residuals could be correlated across observations of the 
same venture capital firm, we cluster standard errors at the venture capital firm level.  
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 report the probit regression results estimating equation 
(3). We control for venture capital firm performance with Ln(IPO market share) in Columns (1) 
and IPO exit in Columns (2). We report the marginal effects of independent variables because 
the raw coefficients of the probit model are usually hard to interpret. The marginal effects of 
Entrepreneur VC in both columns are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
VCs who have a entrepreneurship background are more likely to become a top ranked VC based 
on the Forbes rankings. Specifically, VCs who are former entrepreneurs are 0.9% more likely to 
become a top VC compared to their counterparts who have had no prior entrepreneurship 
                                                            
8 Forbes Midas List 2011’s Top Tech Investors is available at http://www.forbes.com/lists/midas/2011/midas-list-
complete-list.html. See http://www.forbes.com/2011/04/05/midas-list-methodology.html for a detailed methodology 
of constructing this list. 
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background. Given that only 34 (2.2%) VCs in our sample are listed in the Forbes Top Investor 
list, the economic magnitude of having prior entrepreneurship background is highly significant.  
Other VC characteristics also appear to be related to the probability of becoming a 
successful VC. For example, younger VCs and VCs with a longer tenure in the current venture 
capital firm are more likely to be listed as a top ranked VC compared to their counterparts. VC’s 
educational background and their professional certification, on the other hand, have no 
significant impact on the likelihood of being on the Forbes rank.  
 Finally, we examine the relative importance of an entrepreneurship, Wall Street, and 
Main Street background in affecting the success of an individual VC in terms of being listed in 
the Forbes Top Investor rankings. We add Wall Street VC and Main Street VC in equation (3) 
and report the results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9. The coefficient estimates of 
Entrepreneur VCs continue to be positive and significant at the 1% level. On the contrary, the 
coefficient estimates of Wall Street VC and Main Street VC are positive but statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that prior background in Wall Street or Main Street does not contribute 
significantly to the individual success of a VC.   
 Overall, our analysis suggests that a prior background in entrepreneurship significantly 
affects individual VC’s performance in the venture capital industry while neither prior 
experience in Wall Street nor prior experience in Main Street is significant in explaining 
individual success. These results suggest that the skill set needed to be successful in the venture 
capital industry is significantly different from that required in the Wall Street or in the Main 
Street, but is closely related to the skills obtained from one’s experience of being an 
entrepreneur.   
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5. Conclusion 
This paper uses a hand-collected data set on the backgrounds of VCs and provides 
evidence that 13.9% of VCs have been former entrepreneurs before becoming a VC in a typical 
top performing venture capital firm. Venture capital firms with a greater fraction of entrepreneur 
VCs exhibit better firm performance in terms of their IPO market shares and the fraction of 
portfolio firms they take public. The positive relation between entrepreneur VCs and venture 
capital firm performance is stronger for less experienced (smaller and younger) venture capital 
firms, and venture capital firms specializing in high-tech industries and in early-stage 
investments. While VCs with prior background in entrepreneurship are positively related to 
venture capital firm performance, VCs with prior experience in Wall Street and Main Street are 
not significantly related to venture capital firm performance. Finally, we provide evidence that 
entrepreneur VCs are more likely to have better individual performance as measured by a Forbes 
VC ranking.  
Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that entrepreneur VCs have a better 
understanding of the business of starting and developing a new start-up company due to their 
first-hands experience from founding their own firm, and play a role in reducing communication 
and information gaps between an entrepreneur and the VCs backing the entrepreneur.   
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
VC Characteristics (data source: BoardEx and VC Bios from Venture Capital Firm 
Homepage) 
Entrepreneur VC Indicator variable: 1 if the VC is a former entrepreneur, 0 otherwise. 
Wall street VC Indicator variable: 1 if the VC worked at financial industries before 
joining the venture capital firm, 0 otherwise. 
Main street VC Indicator variable: 1 if the VC worked at non-financial industries 
before joining the venture capital firm, 0 otherwise. 
VC age Age of the VC. 
VC tenure Number of years that the VC has worked in the venture capital firm. 
Male Indicator variable: 1 if the VC is a male, 0 otherwise. 
MBA Indicator variable: 1 if the VC has a MBA degree, 0 otherwise. 
JD/MD/PHD 
Indicator variable: 1 if the VC has a JD or MD or PhD degree, 0 
otherwise. 
Elite university 
 
Indicator variable: 1 if the VC graduated from elite universities, 0 
otherwise. 
CPA/CFA Indicator variable: 1 if the VC is a CPA or CFA, 0 otherwise. 
Top VC Indicator variable: 1 if the VC is ranked among the Forbes Midas 
List 2011 Top Tech Investors, 0 otherwise. 
Venture Capital Firm Characteristics (data source: Venture Economics) 
IPO market share IPO market share of a venture capital firm since 1980 based on the 
methodology in Nahata (2008). 
IPO exit The percentage of start-ups financed by a venture capital firm that 
goes public since 1980. 
No. of firms invested 
in the past 
The total number of firms a venture capital firm has invested since 
1980. 
No. of rounds invested 
in the past 
The total number of rounds a venture capital firm has invested since 
1980. 
VC firm age Age of the venture capital firm. 
Industry concentration The value for VC firm i in year t is the sum of the squared 
deviations of the weights (the number of portfolio firms) for each of 
the 18 different industries held by the VC firm i relative to the 
industry weights of the total venture investment. Suppose that in 
year t VC firm-i has jtiw ,,  portfolio firms in industry j (scaled by the 
total number of venture firms). There are a total of jtw ,  venture firms 
in industry j (also scaled by the total number of venture firms. The 
investment concentration of VC firm i at year t is defined as the sum 
of the squared deviations of jtiw ,,  relative to jtw , : 2,,,
18
1
)( jtjti
j
ww 

. 
% investment in early 
ventures 
The fraction of the VC’s investments in early-stage ventures. An 
early-stage venture is one that is in the “start-up/seed” or “early 
stage” when it receives the 1st round VC financing 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of 154 venture capital firms. All variable definitions 
are in the Appendix.  
 
Variable N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
Fraction of entrepreneur VC  154 0.139 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.200 
Fraction of Wall street VC  154 0.368 0.309 0.111 0.333 0.500 
Fraction of Mall street VC 154 0.725 0.296 0.600 0.800 1.000 
Average VC age 154 54.543 7.582 50.692 54.500 58.500 
Average VC tenure 154 12.537 5.657 9.000 11.800 15.000 
Fraction of MBA VC 154 0.460 0.309 0.250 0.500 0.667 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC 154 0.163 0.247 0.000 0.050 0.222 
Fraction of VC from elite schools 154 0.385 0.306 0.113 0.400 0.583 
Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 154 0.059 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.071 
IPO market share 154 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.010 0.019 
IPO exit 154 0.206 0.093 0.154 0.192 0.245 
No. of firms invested in the past 154 179 168 67 139 232 
No. of rounds invested in the past 154 475 513 115 350 625 
VC firm age 154 20.97 10.85 12.00 20.00 30.00 
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Table 2: Entrepreneur VCs and Venture Capital Firm Performance 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimating equation (1) for the sample of 154 venture capital firms. The 
dependent variable in Regression (1) to (3) is the natural logarithm of a venture capital firm’s IPO market share based on the 
methodology in Nahata (2008). The dependent variable in Regression (4) to (6) is the percentage of start-ups financed by a venture 
capital firm that have successfully exited through IPOs since 1980. The remaining variable definitions are in the Appendix. All 
regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln(IPO market share) IPO exit 
Fraction of entrepreneur VC 0.523** 0.505** 0.491* 0.063** 0.064** 0.064** 
(2.562) (2.105) (1.678) (2.006) (2.015) (1.985) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.714*** -0.010 
(10.058) (-1.003) 
Ln(no. of rounds invested in the past) 0.610*** -0.008 
(10.223) (-0.875) 
Ln(VC firm age) 0.268** -0.007 
(2.026) (-0.547) 
Industry concentration 0.303 0.292 -2.282*** -0.060 -0.056 -0.023 
(0.574) (0.631) (-4.694) (-0.784) (-0.687) (-0.263) 
% investment in early ventures -1.347** -1.694*** 0.723 -0.139 -0.139 -0.165* 
(-2.387) (-2.640) (1.071) (-1.457) (-1.374) (-1.734) 
Ln(average VC age) -0.310 -0.423 -0.612 0.043 0.045 0.049 
(-0.565) (-0.747) (-0.826) (0.808) (0.828) (0.900) 
Ln(average VC tenure) -0.033 -0.065 0.094 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 
(-0.242) (-0.505) (0.636) (-0.632) (-0.604) (-0.757) 
Fraction of MBA VC 0.027 0.066 0.103 0.018 0.017 0.018 
(0.109) (0.267) (0.318) (0.702) (0.667) (0.664) 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC -0.319 -0.408* -0.094 0.057 0.058* 0.054 
(-1.442) (-1.786) (-0.309) (1.649) (1.678) (1.555) 
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Fraction of VC from elite schools 0.430* 0.366 0.652** 0.025 0.026 0.023 
(1.777) (1.500) (2.040) (0.845) (0.856) (0.773) 
Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 0.543 0.486 0.170 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 
(1.176) (1.169) (0.318) (-0.201) (-0.165) (-0.137) 
Constant -6.471*** -5.834*** -3.365 0.149 0.136 0.103 
(-2.990) (-2.636) (-1.186) (0.756) (0.679) (0.485) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Adj. R-squared 0.651 0.637 0.345 0.067 0.065 0.061 
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Table 3: Entrepreneur VCs and Venture Capital Firm Performance: 2SLS Regressions 
This table presents 2SLS regressions estimating equation (1) for the sample of 154 venture capital firms. Panel A reports the first-
stage regression results. The dependent variable is the fraction of entrepreneur VCs in a venture capital firm. The key independent 
variable is the instrument that is the local fraction of entrepreneur VCs in the same MSA area of the venture capital firm. Panel B 
reports the second-stage regression results. The dependent variable in Regression (1) to (3) is the natural logarithm of a venture capital 
firm’s IPO market share based on the methodology in Nahata (2008). The dependent variable in Regression (4) to (6) is the percentage 
of start-ups financed by a venture capital firm that have successfully exited through IPOs since 1980. The remaining variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: First-stage regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Fraction of entrepreneur VC 
Local fraction of entrepreneur VC  0.876*** 0.873*** 0.872*** 0.876*** 0.873*** 0.872*** 
(5.219) (5.205) (5.204) (5.219) (5.205) (5.204) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Adj. R-squared 0.278 0.277 0.277 0.278 0.277 0.277 
 
 
Panel B: Second-stage regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln(IPO market share) IPO exit 
Fraction of entrepreneur VC 1.096** 1.328** 1.416* 0.170** 0.166** 0.165** 
(2.100) (2.434) (1.958) (2.153) (2.107) (2.091) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.716*** -0.010 
(11.824) (-1.102) 
Ln(no. of rounds invested in the past) 0.610*** -0.008 
(11.078) (-0.972) 
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Ln(VC firm age) 0.263** -0.007 
(2.273) (-0.587) 
Industry concentration 0.390 0.412 -2.150*** -0.044 -0.041 -0.009 
(0.971) (0.979) (-4.663) (-0.725) (-0.670) (-0.174) 
% investment in early ventures -1.746*** -2.262*** 0.094 -0.213** -0.210** -0.234** 
(-2.729) (-3.332) (0.111) (-2.205) (-2.136) (-2.518) 
Ln(average VC age) -0.491 -0.683 -0.901 0.009 0.012 0.018 
(-1.199) (-1.599) (-1.579) (0.153) (0.198) (0.284) 
Ln(average VC tenure) -0.042 -0.078 0.079 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 
(-0.375) (-0.665) (0.515) (-0.592) (-0.573) (-0.704) 
Fraction of MBA VC 0.109 0.185 0.239 0.033 0.032 0.032 
(0.563) (0.913) (0.877) (1.117) (1.076) (1.089) 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC -0.351 -0.453* -0.145 0.051 0.052 0.048 
(-1.504) (-1.855) (-0.450) (1.448) (1.474) (1.366) 
Fraction of VC from elite schools 0.374** 0.286 0.564** 0.015 0.016 0.013 
(2.061) (1.508) (2.260) (0.542) (0.568) (0.475) 
Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 0.450 0.352 0.015 -0.026 -0.024 -0.023 
(1.177) (0.883) (0.029) (-0.452) (-0.416) (-0.392) 
Constant -5.656*** -4.656*** -2.041 0.301 0.283 0.249 
(-3.416) (-2.703) (-0.901) (1.201) (1.135) (1.003) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Adj. R-squared 0.634 0.602 0.301 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
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Table 4: Entrepreneur VCs and Venture Capital Firm Performance: small vs. large VC firms 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimating equation (1) for two subsamples based on the number of 
portfolio companies the venture capital firm has invested in since 1980. The dependent variable in Regression (1) and (2) is the natural 
logarithm of a venture capital firm’s IPO market share based on the methodology in Nahata (2008). The dependent variable in 
Regression (3) and (4) is the percentage of start-ups financed by a venture capital firm that have successfully exited through IPOs 
since 1980. The remaining variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) 
and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
VARIABLES Ln(IPO market share) IPO exit 
Small VC firms Large VC firms Small VC firms Large VC firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of entrepreneur VC 0.743** 0.488 0.103* 0.028 
(2.099) (0.782) (1.856) (1.104) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.473*** 1.161*** -0.007 0.012 
(4.014) (5.381) (-0.304) (1.064) 
Industry concentration 0.285 3.051 -0.070 0.027 
(0.537) (1.405) (-0.773) (0.187) 
% investment in early ventures -1.341* -1.465 -0.161 -0.135 
(-1.697) (-0.995) (-1.017) (-1.460) 
Ln(average VC age) -0.203 -0.510 0.134* -0.097 
(-0.279) (-0.492) (1.688) (-1.589) 
Ln(average VC tenure) -0.044 -0.066 -0.024 0.007 
(-0.211) (-0.166) (-0.922) (0.588) 
Fraction of MBA VC 0.301 -0.151 0.045 0.014 
(0.777) (-0.251) (1.010) (0.624) 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC -0.143 -0.653 0.062 0.042 
(-0.508) (-1.358) (1.218) (1.381) 
Fraction of VC from elite schools 0.138 0.069 0.076 -0.012 
(0.363) (0.129) (1.555) (-0.592) 
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Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 1.171** -1.498 -0.013 0.039 
(2.148) (-1.158) (-0.120) (1.208) 
Constant -5.793* -7.548 -0.174 0.548** 
(-1.988) (-1.642) (-0.542) (2.018) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77 77 77 77 
Adj. R-squared 0.315 0.550 0.041 0.081 
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Table 5: Entrepreneur VCs and Venture Capital Firm Performance: young vs. old VC firms 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimating equation (1) for two subsamples based on the age of venture 
capital firms. The dependent variable in Regression (1) and (2) is the natural logarithm of a venture capital firm’s IPO market share 
based on the methodology in Nahata (2008). The dependent variable in Regression (3) and (4) is the percentage of start-ups financed 
by a venture capital firm that have successfully exited through IPOs since 1980. The remaining variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. All regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-
statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
VARIABLES Ln(IPO market share) IPO exit 
Young VC firms Old VC firms Young VC firms Old VC firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of entrepreneur VC 0.704** 0.306 0.113*** 0.041 
(2.368) (0.707) (2.775) (1.051) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.839*** 0.655*** -0.006 -0.026 
(11.013) (5.097) (-0.432) (-1.492) 
Industry concentration 2.016*** -0.763 -0.022 -0.100 
(4.342) (-0.841) (-0.141) (-1.333) 
% investment in early ventures -2.163*** 0.022 -0.101 -0.143 
(-3.247) (0.022) (-0.808) (-1.277) 
Ln(average VC age) 0.330 -1.207* 0.102 -0.087 
(0.563) (-1.695) (1.620) (-1.145) 
Ln(average VC tenure) -0.110 0.085 -0.021 -0.009 
(-0.605) (0.435) (-0.777) (-0.455) 
Fraction of MBA VC 0.305 -0.297 0.075* -0.009 
(1.109) (-0.866) (1.672) (-0.279) 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC 0.462 -0.799*** 0.172** 0.034 
(1.306) (-2.753) (2.112) (1.092) 
Fraction of VC from elite schools 0.216 0.615* -0.000 0.084 
(0.624) (1.891) (-0.003) (1.665) 
Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 1.343*** -0.181 0.072 0.026 
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(2.985) (-0.530) (0.923) (0.635) 
Constant -9.604*** -2.962 -0.138 0.732** 
(-4.176) (-1.015) (-0.574) (2.409) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 81 73 81 73 
Adj. R-squared 0.710 0.676 0.126 0.065 
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Table 6: Entrepreneur VCs and Venture Capital Firm Performance: VC firms investing in high-tech industries vs. in non-
high-tech industries 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimating equation (1) for two subsamples based on whether the venture 
capital firm mainly invest in high-tech industries or in non-high-tech industries. The dependent variable in Regression (1) and (2) is 
the natural logarithm of a venture capital firm’s IPO market share based on the methodology in Nahata (2008). The dependent variable 
in Regression (3) and (4) is the percentage of start-ups financed by a venture capital firm that have successfully exited through IPOs 
since 1980. The remaining variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) 
and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
VARIABLES Ln(IPO market share) IPO exit 
VC firms investing 
in high-tech 
industries 
VC firms investing in 
non-high-tech 
industries 
VC firms investing 
in high-tech 
industries 
VC firms investing 
in non-high-tech 
industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of entrepreneur VC 0.390* 1.918 0.076** 0.189 
(1.776) (0.752) (2.425) (0.493) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.746*** 0.803** -0.007 -0.006 
(10.184) (2.396) (-0.674) (-0.105) 
Industry concentration 0.057 1.868 0.049 -0.067 
(0.122) (1.754) (0.545) (-0.272) 
% investment in early ventures -1.172* -1.216 -0.234** -0.043 
(-1.912) (-0.376) (-2.184) (-0.088) 
Ln(average VC age) -0.210 -2.857 0.044 0.053 
(-0.365) (-1.388) (0.823) (0.168) 
Ln(average VC tenure) -0.035 0.493 -0.006 -0.052 
(-0.246) (0.510) (-0.487) (-0.395) 
Fraction of MBA VC -0.074 1.982 0.012 0.127 
(-0.295) (1.481) (0.537) (0.603) 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC -0.279 -2.127 0.057 0.081 
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(-1.336) (-1.195) (1.564) (0.309) 
Fraction of VC from elite schools 0.478* -1.686 0.043 -0.155 
(1.834) (-1.232) (1.449) (-0.708) 
Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 0.283 -0.371 0.028 -0.206 
(0.724) (-0.152) (0.643) (-0.559) 
Constant -7.057*** 0.253 0.136 0.138 
(-3.102) (0.037) (0.676) (0.120) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 132 22 132 22 
Adj. R-squared 0.666 0.225 0.120 -0.765 
 
36 
 
Table 7: Entrepreneur VCs and Venture Capital Firm Performance: VC firms investing in early-stage ventures vs. in late-
stage ventures 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimating equation (1) for two subsamples based on whether the venture 
capital firm mainly invest in early-stage ventures or in late-stage ventures. The dependent variable in Regression (1) and (2) is the 
natural logarithm of a venture capital firm’s IPO market share based on the methodology in Nahata (2008). The dependent variable in 
Regression (3) and (4) is the percentage of start-ups financed by a venture capital firm that have successfully exited through IPOs 
since 1980. The remaining variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) 
and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
VARIABLES Ln(IPO market share) IPO exit 
VC firms investing 
in early-stage 
ventures 
VC firms investing 
in late-stage 
ventures 
VC firms investing 
in early-stage 
ventures 
VC firms investing 
in late-stage 
ventures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of entrepreneur VC 0.667** 0.326 0.103** 0.050 
(2.256) (1.106) (2.145) (0.937) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.728*** 0.909*** 0.016 -0.008 
(9.017) (5.365) (1.108) (-0.299) 
Industry concentration 0.597 -0.315 -0.006 -0.094 
(1.356) (-0.242) (-0.049) (-0.584) 
% investment in early ventures -2.201*** -1.855* -0.011 -0.308 
(-2.729) (-1.793) (-0.065) (-1.482) 
Ln(average VC age) -0.645 0.044 0.082 0.032 
(-1.088) (0.051) (0.599) (0.291) 
Ln(average VC tenure) 0.066 -0.096 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.420) (-0.331) (-0.305) (-0.115) 
Fraction of MBA VC 0.203 -0.318 0.007 0.006 
(0.540) (-0.938) (0.138) (0.107) 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC -0.519** -0.432 -0.047 0.074 
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(-2.129) (-1.272) (-0.755) (1.121) 
Fraction of VC from elite schools 0.078 0.393 -0.008 0.040 
(0.210) (1.209) (-0.142) (0.670) 
Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 0.086 -0.002 -0.055 0.003 
(0.164) (-0.004) (-0.441) (0.023) 
Constant -4.929** -8.359** 0.344 0.675 
(-2.130) (-2.556) (0.606) (1.658) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77 77 77 77 
Adj. R-squared 0.719 0.599 -0.025 0.014 
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Table 8: Entrepreneurship, Wall Street, Main Street Experience and Venture Capital Firm Performance 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimating equation (1) for the sample of 154 venture capital firms. The 
dependent variable in Regression (1) to (3) is the natural logarithm of a venture capital firm’s IPO market share based on the 
methodology in Nahata (2008). The dependent variable in Regression (4) to (6) is the percentage of start-ups financed by a venture 
capital firm that have successfully exited through IPOs since 1980. The remaining variable definitions are in the Appendix. All 
regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln(IPO market share) IPO exit 
Fraction of entrepreneurial VC 0.552*** 0.578** 0.547* 0.066** 0.065** 0.066* 
(2.664) (2.538) (1.868) (1.996) (1.991) (1.977) 
Fraction of Wall Street VC 0.274 0.319 0.157 0.017 0.017 0.018 
(1.268) (1.426) (0.552) (0.641) (0.646) (0.665) 
Fraction of Main Street VC 0.146 -0.025 -0.117 0.007 0.009 0.010 
(0.622) (-0.106) (-0.426) (0.240) (0.322) (0.331) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.731*** -0.009 
(10.346) (-0.933) 
Ln(no. of rounds invested in the past) 0.625*** -0.007 
(10.618) (-0.785) 
Ln(VC firm age) 0.287** -0.004 
(2.061) (-0.329) 
Industry concentration 0.302 0.277 -2.324*** -0.061 -0.056 -0.027 
(0.595) (0.596) (-4.737) (-0.758) (-0.669) (-0.297) 
% investment in early ventures -1.415** -1.688*** 0.778 -0.142 -0.144 -0.169* 
(-2.502) (-2.702) (1.179) (-1.447) (-1.401) (-1.702) 
Ln(average VC age) -0.338 -0.521 -0.707 0.041 0.043 0.046 
(-0.606) (-0.928) (-0.968) (0.694) (0.720) (0.770) 
Ln(average VC tenure) -0.060 -0.090 0.088 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 
(-0.466) (-0.732) (0.598) (-0.733) (-0.720) (-0.854) 
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Fraction of MBA VC 0.002 0.049 0.095 0.016 0.015 0.015 
(0.008) (0.182) (0.274) (0.642) (0.606) (0.568) 
Fraction of JD/MD/PHD VC -0.385 -0.443* -0.083 0.054 0.054 0.050 
(-1.544) (-1.707) (-0.254) (1.424) (1.434) (1.300) 
Fraction of VC from elite schools 0.438* 0.394 0.676** 0.026 0.026 0.023 
(1.685) (1.511) (2.070) (0.901) (0.899) (0.815) 
Fraction of VC with CFA/CPA 0.566 0.575 0.257 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 
(1.282) (1.451) (0.477) (-0.143) (-0.125) (-0.074) 
Constant -6.525*** -5.530** -2.998 0.150 0.133 0.105 
(-2.977) (-2.505) (-1.065) (0.667) (0.582) (0.435) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Adj. R-squared 0.653 0.641 0.339 0.056 0.054 0.050 
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Table 9: Entrepreneur VCs and Individual VC Performance  
This table presents marginal effects of Probit regressions estimating equation (4) for the sample 
of 1,564 VCs. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to one if the VC is 
ranked among the Forbes Midas List 2011 Top Tech Investors, and zero otherwise. 
Entrepreneurial VC is an indicator variable which equals to one if the VC is a former 
entrepreneur, and zero otherwise. The remaining variable definitions are in the Appendix. All 
regressions control for venture capital firm industry fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Entrepreneur VC 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
(3.129) (3.126) (3.210) (3.227) 
Wall street VC 0.001 0.000 
(0.662) (0.526) 
Main street VC 0.001 0.001 
(1.304) (1.199) 
Ln(IPO market share) 0.003** 0.002** 
(2.160) (2.239) 
IPO exit 0.004 0.005 
(0.428) (0.495) 
Ln(no. of firms invested in the past) 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 
(0.189) (3.078) (0.114) (3.045) 
Industry concentration -0.019* -0.023** -0.017* -0.021** 
(-1.809) (-2.401) (-1.855) (-2.463) 
% investment in early ventures 0.016 0.021* 0.015 0.019* 
(1.506) (1.813) (1.465) (1.767) 
Ln(VC age) -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 
(-4.954) (-5.064) (-5.069) (-5.203) 
Ln(VC tenure) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(4.431) (3.943) (4.575) (4.047) 
MBA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.393) (1.272) (1.439) (1.317) 
JD/MD/PHD 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.712) (0.458) (0.687) (0.428) 
Elite university 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.163) (0.295) (0.074) (0.229) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564 
Pseudo R-squared 0.300 0.280 0.305 0.284 
 
 
